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ABSTRACT 
This paper  tests  the effects of  the level and length  of  unemployment 
insurance  (UI>  benefits  on  unemployment  durations.  The paper particularly 
studies individual  behavior  during  the weeks  just prior  to when  benefits 
lapse.  Higher UI benefits  are found to  have a strong negative  effect on  the 
probability  of leaving unemployment.  However,  the probability  of  leaving 
unemployment  rises dramatically  just prior to when  benefits  lapse  When the 
length  of benefits  is  extended,  the probability  of a spell ending  is also  very 
high in  the week  benefits were  previously  expected to  lapse.  Individual  data 
are used  with  accurate  information on spell durations,  and the level and 
length  of benefits.  Semipararnetric estimation  techniques  are used  and 
compared  to alternative  approaches.  The semiparametric  approach yields  more 
plausible  estimates  and provides useful  diagnostics. 
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(312> 491-8484 1.  Introduction 
This  paper  examines the effects of the level  and length  of unemployment 
insurance  (UI) benefits  on  unemployment  durations.  The paper particularly 
studies  individual behavior  during  the weeks  just  prior  to  when benefits 
lapse.  Higher  UI  benefits  are found to have  a strong  negative  effect  on  the 
probability  of  leaving unemployment.  However,  the probability  of  leaving 
unemployment  rises  dramatically just  prior  to when  benefits  lapse.  When the 
length  of  benefits  is extended,  the probability  of a spell  ending  is also  very 
high in  the week  benefits  were  previously  expected  to lapse.  Individual  data 
are used  with accurate information  on  spell  durations,  and the level and 
length of  benefits.  Semiparametric  estimation  techniques  are used  and 
compared  to alternative  approaches.  The semiparametric  approach  yields  more 
plausible  estimates  and provides  useful  diagnostics. 
2.  Theory 
Unemployment  behavior with finite duration  UI has been analyzed  in 
several ways.  Mortensen  (1977) uses  a dynamic search  model.  In  his model, 
individuals  maximize  the present  value  of expected  utility, where  utility  is a 
function  of income and leisure.  There  is no saving in  the model;  individuals 
consume  their income.  A stationary  known wage  offer  distribution  is assumed 
and the arrival  rate of job offers  is constant  over time for a given  search 
intensity.  Mortensen's  escape  rate or  hazard  is proportional  to s[l-F(wfl, 
where  s is the search  intensity, w is the reservation wage and F is the 
cumulative  distribution  of wage  offers.  The hazard  rises with search 
intensity  because  the arrival rate  of job offers  increases.  The hazard  also 
rises as the reservation  wage  declines  since  the probability  of an offer being 
acceptable  rises.  a is shown to increase as one gets closer  to when  benefits 2 
lapse, while w  decreases  as exhaustion  approaches.1  Both derivatives  imply 
that the hazard  rises up until  the point  of UI  exhaustion.  After  exhaustion, 
the environment  Lacing an  unemployed  individual  does not change implying  a 
Constant hazard.  The time  pattern of the hazard  is shown  in Figure  1,  where T 
is  the length  of UI  benefits.2 
Moffitt  and Nicholson  (1982) use a  version  of the static  labor-leisure 
model of individual  choice.  In  this model people have preferences  over two 
goods,  income  and unemployment.  Unemployment  has utility because of its 
leisure value  and because one can  search.  The new job  wage is fixed  and a job 
can be found at any time.  At the time of job loss,  an  individual  chooses 
income and weeks  of  unemployment  subject to a budget  constraint.  The budget 
constraint  has a convex kink  at the week  of  benefit  exhaustion because 
unemployment  ceases  to be subsidized.  Figure  2 shows the budget  constraint. 
is the wage, R  is the fraction  of the wage  replaced  by UI benefits  and T is 
the length  of  benefits.  An indifference  curve  through the kink  point  can  have 
an implied marginal rate  of substitution  equal  to any value between  the slopes 
of the two budget  constraint  segments.  Thus, many people will  maximize  their 
utility by returning to  work  the week  benefits  lapse.  Moffitt  and Nicholson 
1The  reservation  wage  is determined  by the equality  between the value  of 
being employed  at one's reservation wage and being  unemployed  (equation  9(a) 
in  Mortensen  (1977)).  The reservation wage  must decline as exhaustion 
approaches  since the  value  of  being  unemployed  drops.  Search  intensity  is 
determined  by the equality of the marginal  cost  of search  (lost leisure)  and 
the marginal  benefit  of  search  (equation  9(b) in  Mortensen  (1977)).  Since  the 
marginal benefit  of search  increases when the value  of  unemployment  declines, 
search  intensity  increases. 
2The  figure  is drawn  assuming the marginal  utility of leisure  is 
independent  of income.  If  leisure and income are complements  (substitutes), 
the hazard  is discontinuous  at T and higher  (lower) after T than shown. 3 
then  argue  informally  that the random  nature  of  job finding will cause  a 
clustering  of  observations  around  the exhaustion  point. 
The two models  make  very different  assumptions but have  similar 
predictions.  In  the Mortensen  model  the individual  is uncertain  when  a job 
will  be found and  what the wage  will  be.  One remains unemployed  until  a 
sufficiently  high paying  job is  found.  In  the Moffitt  and Nicholson  model  one 
can find  a job at a fixed wage  anytime.  The model  emphasizes  the leisure 
value  that  a period  of  not working  may have if one optimizes  over  a long 
period  of time such  as a  year.  This  explanation  makes  more sense  if there  is 
a significant  demand for home  production  or it is difficult  to take  a vacation 
once  a new job  has begun.3  Both  models  similarly  predict a rising  hazard  as 
the UI exhaustion  point  approaches.  Because of  the stationarity  assumptions, 
Mortensen's  model  implies a monotoriic  increase  in  the hazard  as exhaustion 
approaches.  The Moffitt  and Nicholson  model  is less  precise but a rise in  the 
hazard  around  the exhaustion  point  is implied. 
There  are several aspects of UI unemployment  spells that  are not captured 
by these models.  The length of UI benefits  often changes  in the course  of an 
unemployment  spell.  In the sample  studied below  about 47  percent  of  UI 
recipients  experienced a change in  their  length of  benefits.  Second, 
individuals may make  arrangements  to return  to a  job several weeks  before  they 
actually  do.  Third, recall  is quantitatively  more important  than  new job 
finding for most  UI recepients.  Using  data  from  two states, Corson  and 
Nicholson  (1984) and  Katz and Meyer  (1987)  find that about 60  percent  of 
spells end in  recall.  Katz (1985) provides  a clear discussion  of search  with 
3lmplicit  in  this discussion  is  the assumption  that the search 
requirement  for UI receipt can  be satisfied  at low cost. 4 
recall and infinite  length unemployment  insurance.  However,  recall  dates 
likely depend  on individual  or  typical UI benefit  lengths.  If  workers  are 
bound  to firms by implicit contracts,  moving  costs,  specific human  capital,  or 
other reasons,  firms have  an incentive  to  base recall decisions  on the length 
of  UI benefits. 
Mortensen  (1987) provides  a model which  has this characteristic.  He 
analyzes  a  joint  wealth  maximizing  model  of  job separations with  firms  facing 
transitory  demand changes  and limited  duration  of  unemployment  benefits.  The 
discrete  change  in  the flow  value  of  being unemployed  when  benefits  are 
exhausted  yields  the prediction  that  many  firms may recall  laid-off workers 
around  the benefit exhaustion  point. 
3.  Data 
The data are from  the Continuous  Wage  and benefit History  (CWBH) UI 
administrative  records used  by  Moffitt  (l985a, 1985b).  Males  from  twelve 
states during  the period  1978-1983  are examined.  The advantage  of CWBH  data 
is accurate  information on  weeks  of  UI receipt, pre-unemployment  earnings,  the 
UI benefit,  and the potential  duration  of  benefits  over time.  The importance 
of  accurate  data  is  highlighted  by  the large degree  of  measurement  error  that 
has been found in the weeks  unemployed  variable  in  some  household  surveys.4 
4poterba  and Summers  (1984) and Sider(l984)  examine  the Current 
Population  Survey.  Using data  matched  across  two consecutive  months,  Poterba 
and Summers  check if  the reported  length of continuing  unemployment  spells 
increases by four  to five  weeks  in  the course  of a month.  Allowing  for a 
three-week  margin  of  error  they  find  that only 57 percent of  responses  are 
consistent.  Sider studies  the distribution  of reported incomplete 
unemployment  spells.  He finds a pronounced  tendency to report  round  numbers 
such  as 26 and  39  weeks.  This clustering  cannot  be due to UI since these  are 
incomplete  spell  lengths. 5 
Additionally,  the UI parameters,  benefit level  and duration,  are often  missing 
from  other data  sources.  The CWBH data  provide accurate  information  on these 
key variables. 
The disadvantage  of the data  is that  only  information  on  weeks 
compensated by the  UI system  is available.  Individuals  are censored  when 
their benefits  lapse, so behavior  beyond  the exhaustion  point cannot  be 
examined,  Also,  an individual may not receive UI  continuously;  weeks may be 
skipped during  which benefits  are not received.5  The spell  of  benefit  receipt 
may be more  useful  than  the unemployment  spell when unemployment  is briefly 
interrupted  but followed  by more  unemployment.  The spell of  benefit  receipt 
may do a  better  job of  grouping  together periods of similar behavior.  The 
sample  is composed of two parts of roughly equal size.  The first part is a 
random sample, while  the second oversamples  from states  and time periods  that 
are more  likely  to have  unchanging  benefit  lengths. 
The Moffitt dataset  contains 4,626  observations.  Two exclusions6  leave 
3,365 observations  which  are analyzed.  Descriptive  statistics  for the sample 
are given  in  Table  1.  The mean  pre-Ul  weekly  income  is 169.5 after  taxes7  (in 
1977 dollars).  The mean  weekly  benefit  is 104.2  .70 is the mean  UI 
replacement  ratio  (benefits divided by after-tax  income).  The mean  beginning 
5The sample  is restricted  to those whose  gaps between  periods of benefit 
receipt are cumulatively  less than  ten  weeks.  See Moffitt  (1985a, 1985b) for 
a more detailed  discussion. 
- 
61,227 observations  have  missing  data  on age, schooling,  dependents  or 
marital  status.  36  observations  have  negative  values  for time until  benefits 
lapse. 
7me  marginal  tax rate was calculated  by Walter  Corson  of Mathematica 
Policy  Research.  The calculations use family  income and account for state and 
federal income  taxes and Social Security  payroll taxes of spell state unemployment  rate is fairly high  during  this period  at  8.7 
percent.  The average number  of  weeks of  benefits  received  is just over  13. 
A  more complete  illustration of the pattern of  weeks  of  UI receipt  and 
censoring  can be seen in  Table  2 and Figure 3.  Table  2 gives  the empirical 
hazard  for the data.  The empirical  hazard  is the fraction  of spells  ongoing 
at the start  of a  week  which  end during  the week.8  In Figure  3 there  are 
several periods when the empirical hazard  is noticeably  higher  than 
surrounding  periods.'  The high  hazard  in  the first several weeks  is probably 
caused  by the high frequency of recalls in  the early  weeks  of  unemployment.9 
The hazard  is higher  between  25 and 29 weeks  and then  again  between  35 and 38 
weeks.  These  jumps  are probably  caused  by UI exhaustion.  An examination  of 
Table  3 provides some evidence  on  this point.  Table  3 reports  the 
distribution of two measures of  the  length  of UI benefits.  Initial length  is 
the number of weeks  of benefits  an individtal  is entitled  to when his spell 
begins.  Since benefit  lengths often change in the course  of  an  individuals 
spell,  the maximum  length  is also reported.  The rises  in  the hazard  are 
roughly coincident  with  weeks  when  benefits commonly  lapse.  However  the 
timing of some of  the peaks  in the hazard  is inconsistent with the earlier 
theories.  The peak at 26  for example  cannot  be caused  by benefits  running 
out after  26  weeks.  Such  individuals would  be censored  at 26  so  we would  not 
observe  the end of their spells.  This is discussed  in more detail  later. 
8More formally,  the empirical hazard for week t (Ht), is the number  of 
failures  during  the week (Dt), divided by the size  of the risk  set at the 
beginning  of the week.  The size  of the risk  set at the beginning  of week  t 
(Rt), is just the number  of people  whose spells  have not ended or been 
censored  at the beginning  of week t.  Algebraically,  Ht — Dt/Rt.  C. is the 
number  of  observations  which are censored  at the beginning  of week .  C — 
-  -  Rt. 
9See Corson  and Nicholson  (1983) and  Katz (1985, 1986). 7 
There  are several causes  for the variability  in  benefit  lengths seen in 
Table  3.  First,  there is  variability  across  states in  the length  of  regular 
benefits  provided.  During  the sample  period, Louisiana  typically  provided  28 
weeks,  Pennsylvania  provided  30  weeks,  while most other  states provided  26 
weeks  of  benefits.  Second, benefits were  extended  during  periods  of  high 
unemployment  under several  federal programs.  The Extended  Benefits program 
extended  benefits  50  percent beyond  state durations,  up to a maximum  of  39 
weeks,  whenever  the insured unemployment  rate  was above a trigger level.  In 
1981,  the system  changed  from  a state or  federal  trigger to a higher, state 
only trigger.  Two other  programs provided  supplemental  benefits.  At the 
beginning  of tl-&e  sample period,  the Federal Supplemental  Benefits program 
provided  up to a total of 65  weeks  of  benefits,  Beginning  in  the Fall of 1982 
he Federal Supplementary  Compensation  program provided  up to  62 weeks  of 
benefits.  These first two sources of  variation  are quantitatively  the most 
important.  Lastly, within  a state  at a  point  in time the length  of benefits 
may depend  on an individual's work  history.  The distribution  of  benefit 
lengths reported  in  Table  3 reflects all of  these  factors. 
I initially  examine  the effects of finite  length UI benefits 
nonparametrically  and without  explanatory  variables.  Table  4 gives an 
empirical hazard  analogous  to the Kaplan-Meier  estimator.  Figure 4 displays  a 
graph of the hazard.  The time  axis is time  until benefits  lapse  rather than 
time  since a spell began.  There  is a  noticable  rise in  the hazard  about five 
weeks  before  benefits  lapse.  The  hazard  also jumps  dramatically  the week 
before  benefits  end.  For the other  weeks  there  is no discernable  trend, 
except a somewhat  lower hazard  when exhaustion  is more than  nine  months  away. 8 
4.  Duration  Nodels 
Several aspects of Table  4  point  to  the need for more  sophisticated 
modeling.  The hazard  is high at  24, 25,  36, 37, and 38 weeks before 
exhaustion.  This is  due to  the large number  of people  with initial durations 
of  26 and 39 weeks,  and the higher  baseline  hazard  in  the first  few weeks of 
unemployment  as seen  in Figure  3.  Additionally,  the Kaplan-Meier  hazard 
assumes  that the sample  is  homogeneous,  i.e.,  that there is no  heterogeneity 
which  depends on either  observable  or  unobservable  factors.  However  one 
expects  that the characteristics  causing a lower hazard  will  be more 
concentrated  among  the remaining  individuals as  one approaches  exhaustion. 
For example,  the remaining  observations  are likely  to be disproportionately 
high  benefit, nonwhite,  and  older.  This  sorting effect  may mask  a much larger 
increase  in  the hazard  as exhaustion  approaches.  These  problems  are 
potentially  solved  by using  a duration model.  If the effect  of time since  the 
beginning  of a spell  is handled  in a flexible manner  it should  account for the 
higher  hazard  just  after  26 and 39 weeks  until exhaustion.  Similarly,  one can 
look  at  the pure  effect  of getting closer to  exhaustion,  holding  other 
explanatory  variables  constant. 
The importance  of time  dependent  covariates  and censoring  in the data 
make a duration model especially  useful.  The theories of unemployment 
behavior  with  UI discussed  earlier, imply that  the hazard  should  increase  as 
exhaustion  approaches.  It is difficult  to allow  for this with explanatory 
variables  constant over  time.  The initial duration  of benefits  does  not 
reflect  future extensions.  The maximum duration  of  benefits  is an endogenous 
variable  since benefits have a  higher  probability  of being  extended  if an 9 
unemployment  spell  lasts  longer)0  This suggests  using a (not necessarily 
linear) function  of time until  exhaustion  to account for the length of 
benefits.  Regression  approaches  to  this problem  are further plagued  by  the 
censoring  of over  a quarter  of  the spells.  The biases  from  censoring  are 
discussed  extensively  by Welch (1977) in  the context  of UI studies. 
Greene(l98l)  and Chung  and Goldberger(1984)  derive  the magnitude  of the bias 
under certain  assumptions.  Alternatively,  one can assume  a shape  for the 
distribution  of spells  and use Tobit  type techniques, but estimates  are very 
sensitive  to the assumed  shape.11  A duration  model can be less parametric 
about  the shape  of  the distribution  and still allow censoring. 
The estimation  approach  used  here is an extension  of  Prentice  and 
Cloeckler  (1978) which is discussed  extensively  in  Meyer  (1986).  The shape  of 
the hazard  is nonparametrically  estimated.  In this respect the approach  is 
similar to  the method  used  successfully  by Moffitt  (1985a))-2  However,  the 
approach  taken here  has several advantages.  The estimates  are parameters  of a 
continuous  time  hazard  model  and thus retain an easy interpretation.  Second, 
the probabilites  of  surviving  each  period  are constrained  to lie between 0 and 
I.  Third,  there  is a large  literature  discussing  the importance  of allowing 
10Consider  the case  where  the initial length of  benefits  is the same for 
all individuals and assume  that the length of  benefits  does not affect  the 
length of spells.  If  benefits  have a positive  probability  of being  extended 
each  period,  the expected  value  of the maximum duration  will be a monotonic 
function  of the dependent  variable. 
11Moffitt  (l985b)  examines  two unemployment  spell  data  sets and finds the 
estimates  to be  quite  sensitive  to the distribution  assumed.  An alternative 
approach which  would  eliminate  the distributional  assumption  would  involve 
slightly modifying  semiparametric  estimators  for Tobit models  such  as Powell 
(1984). 
12Green and Shoven  (1986) use an approach close  to  Moffitt'a  in  their 
examination of mortgage  prepayments. 10 
for unobservable  differences  across  people)-3  These  differences  are usually 
called  unobserved  heterogeneity.  It is relatively  easy to test for 
heterogeneity  and estimate  it  parametrically  in this  model.  The distribution 
of the heterogeneity  component  can be  nonparametrically  estimated  as  well. 
Formally,  let Ti be the length  of individual  i's unemployment  spell.  Then  the 
hazard  for individual  i at time t,  i(t)  is defined  by the equation 
lim  prob[t+h>T.t  T.￿t)  .X.(t)  - 
h—'O 
h 
The hazard  is parameterized  here using  the proportional  hazards  form, i.e. 
A.(t) — 
where 
A0(t)  is the baseline  hazard  at time t, which is unknown, 
z.(t)  is a vector  of time  dependent  explanatory  variables  for 
individual  i, and 
- 
is a vector  of  parameters  which is unknown. 
The probability  that a spell lasts until  time  t-i-l  given  that it  has 
lasted  until t is easily  written  as a function of the hazard. 
ti-I 
(1)  PET.  t+l  T.  ti —  exp 
[ 
- 5 A.(u)du 
] 
t+l 
— exp 
{ 
-  exp(z1(t)').5 A0(u)du 
] 
given that  z.(t)  is constant  between  t and t+l. 
Equation  (1) can be rewritten  as 
(2)  P[T1  t+l  Ti  t] — exp 
{ 
- exp(z.(t)' + T(t)  ) ] 
where 
1-3Examples  include Lancaster  (1979) and Heckman  and Singer  (1984)  - 1]. 
t÷l 
(3)  7(t) —  ln(  f .)0(u)du} 
t 
The  log-likelihood  for a sample of N individuals  can be written  as a 
function  of terms such  as 
N  kitl 
(4) L(y,) —  -  exp[(t)+z.(t)') 
i—i  t—l 
where  C. is the censoring  time, 8—l  if  T. ￿  C. and 0 otherwise,  and k. — 
L  1.  1  1  1 
rnin(int(T.),C.).  It is assumed  that censoring  does not provide  any 
information  about T  beyond  that  available  in the covariates. 
Observations  lasting  more than  39  weeks  were  censored  at  39,  Only 2.4 
percent of the spells were continuing  at this  point.  Given  the small  number 
of  observations  lasting  more than 39 weeks, one would  need to make  strong 
parametric  assumptions  to make inferences  about very long  unemployment  spells. 
The likelihood  function  (4)  is now a function of $ and the 38 elements  of . 
The  likelihood  is easily  maximized  by standard  techniques.  If unobserved 
heterogeneity  is present  the hazard  becomes 
— &.A0(t)exp(z.(t)'} 
where 9.  is a random  variable  that  is assumed to be independent  of z(t). 
This model  can  be estimated  given a parametric  assumption  on the 
distribution  of  Even if  the distribution  of 9.  is  unknown,  and  can be 
consistently  estimated  using  an extension  of  the Heckman  and Singer  (1984) 
approach.  See Meyer (1986)  for the likelihood  function  and a proof  of 
consistency. 
L4See equation  (2.6) and the surrounding  text in  Meyer  (1986)  for a 
complete  description. 12 
5. Results 
The effects  of unemployment  insurance are measured  using  functions  of the 
benefit  level  and the time until  benefits  lapse.  The log of weekly  benefits 
and  pre-Ul income are included  in  most specifications.  Similar  results  are 
obtained  when the level of benefits  and income  are used  and when the UI 
replacement  ratio  is tried.  High  benefits  are expected  to decrease  the hazard 
because they  lower  the opportunity  cost  of search  and leisure.  High  previous 
earnings  are expected  to raise  the hazard  since  the cost of unemployment  in 
terms  of lost  wages is higher  and  because high earnings  are likely  correlated 
with  unobserved  job finding ability.  The other UI variables  are UI 1 to 
UI 41-54  which  form  a spline in time  until benefit  exhaustion.  The 
coefficient  on UI 2-5 is the additional  effect  on the hazard  of having  moved  1 
week  closer  to exhaustion  when  one is  2-5 weeks  away.  The coefficient  on UI 1 
is the additional  effect  on  the hazard  when one moves from  2 to 1 week from 
exhaustion.  Thus,  the effect  of moving  from  6  weeks  away  to 1 week is 4 
times  the UI 2-5 coefficient  plus the UI 1 coefficient.  The other UI 
coefficients  have analogous  interpretations. 
Formally,  let  r  be the number  of  weeks  until benefits  lapse.  Then 
UI 1  1 if  r — 1,  and 
0 otherwise 
UI 2-5 — min(6-r,4)  if  5, and 
0 otherwise 
UI 6-10  — min(ll-r,5) if  10, and 
0 otherwise, 
and similarly  for the remaining  variables. 
The theories  discussed  in  Section 2 predict that  the exhaustion  spline 
coefficients  should  be positive.  The prediction  depends  on the stationarity 13 
of the offer  arrival  function  and the wage distribution  in Mortensen  (1977). 
If the stationarity  assumptions  are relaxed,  the predictions  of the model  are 
indeterminant.  However,  one might  well find  that the exhaustion  affect 
dominates  in  the weeks  just  before  exhaustion,  implying  positive  coefficients 
for these spline  segments.  In Moffitt  and  Nicholson  (1982)  the prediction  for 
the segments  far from  exhaustion  depends  on  the distribution  of  preferences. 
Thus,  the most robust prediction  seems  to be positive  coefficients  on the 
segments  close  to exhaustion. 
The results are reported  in Tables  5 through 9.  The coefficients  on the 
explanatory  variables  are in Tables  5 and  6.  The simpler  specifications  are 
discussed  first,  then  the more sophisticated  ones.  The weekly  benefit and 
after-tax  weekly  earnings  coefficients  have the expected  signs  and are 
precisely  estimated.  High wages  and low benefits  increase  the hazard.  Using 
the coefficient  estimates  from  specification  (1),  which  are typical,  a 10 
percent  increase  in  benefits  at the mean is associated  with an 8.8 percent 
decrease  in  the hazard.  The time  until  exhaustion  spline coefficients  are 
jointly  highly  significant;  two of the coefficients  are significant 
individually.  The point  estimates  indicate  that moving  from  54 to 41 weeks 
from  exhaustion  increases  the hazard  by 32 percent.  Between  41 to 6 weeks  the 
hazard  is basically  flat, but the point  estimate  is a small  decrease  in  the 
hazard.  From  6 to  2 weeks  until  exhaustion  the hazard  rises  67 percent,  and 1 
week  away the hazard  rises  an additional  97  percent.  Cumulatively,  the hazard 
more than  triples  as  one moves  from  6 weeks  to I week until  exhaustion. 
The coefficient  on the state  unemployment  rate has the expected  sign  and 
is significantly  different  from  zero.  In  specification  (1),  the implied 
effect  of  a one percentage  point  increase  in  the unemployment  rate is •a 2.4 14 
percent  reduction  in  the hazard.  The hazard  falls  almost  monotonically  with 
age.  Those  17-24  have the highest  hazard  while those 55 and over  have the 
lowest. 
Table 7 illustrates  the value  of the baseline  hazard  parameters  as a 
diagnostic  tool.  Even  with the time  until exhaustion  spline  included  in  the 
specification,  spikes  in  the hazard  remain  at 26, 28, 32, and 36 weeks.  The 
spikes may be caused  by individuals arranging  to be recalled  or begin a new 
ob  well  before  benefits  run out.  If  benefits  are extended  in the intervening 
period,  the result  would be a higher  hazard  after  common  UI exhaustion  points. 
This hypothesis  is tested  by adding  a  variable  equal  to I in  week t, if 
earlier in  the spell  it  was expected  that  benefits  would lapse at c.15  The 
variable  is used in  specification  (3)  and specifications  (5) through  (8).  The 
coefficient  always  has a large asymptotic  t-statistic.  The point  estimates 
imply  a four-  to five-fold  increase  in  the hazard  in  the week benefits  were 
expected  to lapse.  When the benefits  expected  to lapse variable  is included, 
the spikes at 26, 28,  and 36 are no longer  present,  and the one at 32 
declines.  This  result  can be seen  by comparing  Table  7 with  Table  8 and Table 
9.  The estimates  provide  support for the hypothesis  that  early  in spells  some 
firms  and employees  plan  when  unemployment  will end.16  This finding  accords 
with the Moffitt  and Nicholson  model  in which  the length  of the unemployment 
spell  is selected  when unemployment  begins.  An alternative  explanation  for 
15it is assumed  that  changes  in  UI benefit  lengths are not foreseen.  To 
predict  changes,  an individual  would  need  to predict  unemployment  rates  and 
congressional  actions.  As long as the prediction  is not perfect,  one would 
expect  an effect  of the old exhaustion  date on  the hazard. 
l6i originally  included separate  variables  for recent  changes  in  the 
length  of benefits (in the last 8 weeks) and changes  that took  place anytime 
during  the spell.  The coefficient  on  the within  the rast  8 weeks  variable  was 
always  larger  but never  significantly  different  from  the other  coefficient. 15 
the result  might  be that  some  people  eligible  for extended  benefits  do not 
claim  them,  despite  the simplicity  of the procedure  and the financial  reward. 
The second  advantage  of  nonparametric  estimation  of the baseline  hazard 
is consistency  of covariate  coefficients  when the shape of the baseline  hazard 
is not known.  Despite  lack  of theoretical  support for any particular  shape, 
numerous  authors  have  fitted  models  with a  Weibull  baseline  hazard. 
Specifications  (2)  and (6) impose  a Weibull  baseline,  allowing  a comparison  of 
techniques.  Likelihood  ratio  tests of the null  hypothesis  of a Weibull 
baseline  reject,  indicating  that  the Weibull  model  is misspecified.  The 
chi-square  statistics  with 36 degrees of freedom are 93.93  and 53.32  for 
specifications  (2)  and (6), respectively.17  Note that the Weibull  assumption 
is a much  better  approximation  when the benefits  expected  to lapse variable  is 
included. 
There is some  evidence  that the Weibull  assumption  has biased tha 
coefficiants,  particularly  those  on  the time-varying  covariates.  In 
specification  (1)  the unemployment  rate coefficient  is negative  and 
significant,  while  in the Weibull model of  specification  (2)  it is positive. 
Two of the coefficients  of the UI exhaustion  spline  also change  sign,  but they 
are insignificant  using  either  estimator.  The coefficients  on time-constant 
covariates  are  very close  in the two sets  of  estimates.  These results  confirm 
intuitive  arguments  about  the effects of misspecifying  the baseline  hazard. 
Since  the time pattern of the hazard  has been  misspecified,  coefficients  on 
time-vsryingcovariates,  which  depend  on the time pattern  of the hazard,  are 
17The  critical values  at the .05 and .01 level are 51.00  and 5362, 
respectively.  Specification  (2)  is rejected  at conventional  significance 
levels.  Specification  (5) is rejected  at the  .05 level, but just  passes  at 
the .01 level. 16 
more  likely  to be biased  than  other  coefficients.  This result  has also  been 
found in some  preliminary  Monte  Carlo  experiments. 
Specifications  (4) through  (9) include state  fixed effects.  Fixed 
effects  are included  because  omitted  state characteristics  may affect  both 
unemployment  and the generosity  of state UI systems.  The omission  of fixed 
effects  in this situation would  bias  estimated  UI responses)-8  Several 
authors have found  variables which are correlated  with  both  unemployment  and 
the generosity  of UI programs.  Medoff  (1979)  finds that the layoff  subsidy 
from incomplete  UI experience  rating  is higher  for union establishments  than 
nonunion  establishments,  Unionization  also leads  to greater use of layoffs 
independent  of the UI  subsidy.  Adams (1986)  finds that  the UI subsidy  per 
worker  to employers  is correlated  with the diversifiability  of state 
employment,  the skewness of state unemployment  rates, and several  industrial 
characteristics.  However,  it is unclear whether  the correlations  found  by 
Medoff  and  Adams  reflect  the political  economy of UI legislation  or the 
effects  of UI on employment  and layoff  patterns.1'9 
A  comparison  of specifications  (3) and (7) overwhelmingly  supports  the 
presence  of state  fixed effects.  The likelihood  ratio  test  statistic  is 
217.78 and is distributed  chi-square  with 11 degrees of freedom  under the null 
hypothesis  of  no fixed  effects.2°  There  is some  evidence  that the endogeneity 
1'8The  omitted  state characteristics  are assumed to be constant  over the 
sample period  so that fixed effects  estimates  are consistent. 
19The  latter  view is adopted  by Deere  and Miron (1986) who argue that  the 
distribution  of  State  employment  by industry  is shaped  by UI laws. 
20The  critical  values  at  the  .05 and .01 level  are 19.68 and 24.72, 
respectively.  The states with the lowest hazards  all else  equal  are Nevada, 
New  Mexico,  and Wisconsin.  Missouri,  North Carolina,  and South  Carolina  have 
the highest  hazards. 17 
of state  UI laws biases  the UI benefit  coefficient  in  the estimates  without 
fixed effects.  Specifications  (3) and (7) are identical  except  for the use of 
fixed effects in (7).  In  the fixed effects  specification  the coefficient  on 
benefits  drops 29 percent  in  absolute value to - .60.  All other  fixed  effects 
specifications  have similar coefficients  in  the  - .50  to - .60  range, except 
specifications  (4) and (5).  The coefficients  in specifications  (4)  and (5) 
have a slightly  different  interpretation  because of  the large unobserved 
heterogeneity  variance.  The inclusion  of unobserved  heterogeneity  tends  to 
increase  the absolute  value of  coefficients,  even though  expected  duration 
elasticities  may not change much.21 The exhaustion  spline and  benefits 
expected  to lapse variables  do not appreciably  change. 
The introduction  of state  fixed effects  dramatically  changes  the state 
unemployment  rate  coefficient.  The unemployment  rate is the monthly  CPS state 
unemployment  rate interpolated  to give a weekly  series.  In the specifications 
with a nonparametric  baseline  but without  state  fixed  effects  (specifications 
(1) and (3)), the coefficient  on unemployment  is negative.  These 
specifications  estimate  the unemployment  coefficient  using  variation  in 
unemployment  across  states  as well  as over time.  On the other  hand,  state 
fixed  effects  specifications  controL  for the state  level of unemployment  and 
21The  coefficients  reported  are always  the logarithmic  derivatives  of the 
hazard  with respect  to the covariates.  Even  when these logarithmic 
derivatives  are the same,  elasticities  of other measures  of  spell  length  may 
change.  This rescaling  effect is discussed  in  Lancaster  (1979,  1985).  In a 
hazard  model  with no time-varying  regressors,  no censoring,  and  a Peibull 
baseline  hazard,  Lancaster  (1985) derives  the asymptotic  bias from  omission  of 
heterogeneity.  He finds  that  all coefficients  are biased  towards  zero by the 
same proportion.  However,  elasticities  with respect  to the expected  value  of 
the log of duration  are unbiased.  With  censored  data and time-varying  covariates  the appropriate  elasticity  to report  is unclear.  A good  approach 
might be to report  the elasticities  of the probability  of a spell  lasting a 
given  number  of  weeks,  for a representative  path  of the covariates. 18 
only  use the time-series  variation  in  unemployment  to estimate  the 
coefficient.  In  the six specifications  with state fixed  effects 
(specifications  (4) through  (9)), the state unemployment  rate  coefficient  is 
positive  and almost  always  significantly  different  from  zero. 
These  results  imply  that  across  state and over time  variation  in 
unemployment  have  opposite  effects  for this time  period.  States  with  higher 
unemployment  rates, all else  equal, have longer  unemployment  spells.  However, 
a rise in  the unemployment  rate over time for a given  atate  is associated  with 
a shortening  of unemployment  spells in that  state.  An explanation  for this 
result  is that  layoffs  are countercyclical;  in  recessions  the fraction  of 
unemployment  due to layoffs rises.22  Layoff  spells also tend  to be shorter. 
Thus,  it would  not  be surprising  if  the average  duration  of unemployment 
spells  fell.  As mentioned  earlier,  layoff  spells  are particularly 
concentrated  among UI recipients.  Furthermore,  Dynarski  and Sheffrin  (1987) 
find  similar  results for a sample  of household  heads during  1980-81  from  the 
PSID.  They find that  the aggregate  U.S. unemployment  rate is negatively 
correlated  with unemployment  duration,  with and  without  controls  for 
demographic  characteristics,  industry and occupation.  Because  the aggregate 
unemployment  rate is used,  Dynarski  and Sheffrin  have  analyzed  the effects  of 
time-series  variation  in the unemployment  rate.  Thus,  their  estimates  accord 
with the coefficients  from the sample  studied here. 
Allowing  for unobserved  heterogeneity  does  not change  the conclusions 
about  the effects  of  UI.  Three  specifications  ((4),  (5) and (8)),  include 
gamma  distributed  unobserved  heterogeneity.  The coefficients  on UI  benefits, 
the time  until  exhaustion  spline, and the variable  for benefits  previously 
22See  Feldstein  (1975) and Lilien  (1980). 19 
expected  to lapse,  are similar in the heterogeneity  and  no heterogeneity 
specifications.  The UI variables  always  show strong  effects  in the directions 
found earlier.  In  two specifications,  (4) and (5), the variance  of  the 
heterogeneity  is significantly  different  from  zero.23  In  several  other 
specifications  no heterogeneity  is  found.  This result  is puzzling,  however in 
Monte Carlo  experiments  Ridder  and Verbakel  (1983) find  that  a zero  estimated 
variance  is not uncommon.  They find  this result  even  when the estimated  and 
true models  are identical.  1 have also found  this result  in some  preliminary 
Monte  Carlo  experiments. 
Specifications  (5)  and (7) allow  a direct  comparison  of estimates  with 
and without  heterogeneity.  The coefficients  in the heterogeneity 
specification  tend  to be larger in  absolute  value  as suggested by Lancaster, 
but among  the UI coefficients  only the benefit  zoefficient  is appreciably 
larger.  The spline  in time until  benefit  exhaustion,  and the benefits 
expected  to lapse  variable,  are barely  affected.  The estimated  baseline 
hazard  becomes  decidedly  upward  sloping however,  when gamma  heterogeneity  is 
allowed.  Compare Tables  8 and 9 to see this result. 
Separate  specifications  analogous  to (8) were  estimated  for the two 
subsamples  discussed  in Section  3.  The estimates  for the random sample  are 
shown  in  specification  (8).  The estimates  for the sample  with  mostly  constant 
benefit  lengths are shown  in  specification  (9).  In the random  subsample, 
benefits  have a smaller  effect than  in specification  (5),  but similar  to 
specifications  (6),  (7)  and (9).  The effect  of approaching  the week benefits 
lapse  is more pronounced,  but the benefits  expected  to lapse effect  is 
23The  asymptotic  t-statistics  for specifications  (4)  and (5) are  3.89  and 
4.05, respectively.  The critical values  in a one-taled  test  at the .05 and 
.01 levels  are 1.64  and 2.33, respectively. 20 
slightly smaller.  The constant benefit length  subsample also  gives  estimates 
similar to  earlier ones, except  the time until exhaustion  spline  is U-shaped 
as in  Moffitt  (1985). 
6.  Some  Cownts  om the Results  snd  Conclusions 
In the preceeding  pages, all of the simpler specifications  are rejected 
in favor of  specification  (5).  For this reason, estimates  from  specification 
(5)  are used to summarize  the results.  The coefficient  on  the UI benefit 
level  is precisely  estimated  and implies that  a 10  percent increase  in 
benefits  is associated  with  an  8.8 percent decrease in the hazard.  The 
coefficient  suggests a relatively  large disincentive effect  of  UI.  Somewhat 
smaller estimates  are obtained when the same model  is used on  the random 
subsample  in  specification  (8).  The benefit coefficient  implies that  a 10 
percent  increase in  benefits  is associated with  a 5.3 percent  decrease  in  the 
hazard.  Since  specification  (5) hes a much larger heterogeneity  variance,  the 
two specifications  may lead  to  similar expected  duration  elasticities.  One 
should  note that the estimates  only  apply to  the hazard  prior  to exhaustion. 
Higher  benefits  may lead  to a  higher  hazard  after exhaustion  as suggested by 
Mortensen  (1977). 
The time  until exhaustion  spline  coefficients are jointly highly 
significant;  three of the coefficients  are individually significantly 
different  from  zero an conventional  levels.  The point  estimates  imply  chat 
moving  from 54 to 41 weeks  until  exhaustion  raises the hazard  by 46 percent. 
The hazard  is essentially  flat  between  41 and 6 weeks, but the point  estimates 
imply  a small decrease  in  the hazard.  Between  6 and 2 weeks  before  benefit 
exhaustion  the hazard  rises  109 percent.  One week  away  the hazard  rises en 
additional  95  percent.  Cumulatively,  the hazard  more  than  quadruples  as  one 21 
moves  from  6 weeks  to  1 week  until  exhaustion.  The pronounced  rise in  the 
hazard  as exhaustion  approaches  supports  the models  of both  Mortensen  (1977) 
and  Moffitt  and Nicholson  (1982). 
While the spike  in the hazard  just  before  exhaustion  is striking,  few 
spells last  sufficiently  long to be affected  by the spike.  Almost  all of  the 
effect of  UI on mean  spell lengths comes  from  the level of  benefits.  Here the 
estimated  effect of the benefit level  is toward  the high  end  of the 
distribution  of  recent  estimates.  A consensus  of  the previous  estimates  of 
the effect  of a ten percentage  point  increase  in  the replacement  ratio might 
be a one-half  to one week increase in the length of  spells.24  Here  the 
estimate  is around  one and one-half weeks.  The results also  differ  from  those 
of  Topel  (1983, 1984) who argues that  the key mechanism  by  which UI raises  the 
unemployment  rate is the increased  incidence  of  temporary  layoffs rather  than 
the lowered exit  rate from  unemployment. 
Larger  estimated  effects are a plausible  result of better  data  on spell 
length  and the level and length of  benefits.  In  the Ct'S  data  used  by Topel, 
one must  make an  educated guess whether  or  not an individual  is receiving 
benefits  and then impute their level.  Difficulties  with the  Ct'S  length of 
unemployment  spell variable were  mentioned  in  Section  3.  However,  the 
estimates  are sufficiently different  from  most  other estimates  that a further 
24Hamermesh  (1977) concludes  that  "the best estimate--if  one chooses  a 
single  figure--is  that a 10-percentage  point increase  in  the gross 
replacement  rate leads to an  increase  in the duration  of  insured unemployment 
of  about half  a week  when  labor markets are tight."  Danziger,  Haveman  and 
Plotnick  (1981) eport a wide  range of estimates,  but suggest that Moffitt  and 
Nicholson  (1982) offers  the most  reliable  estimates.  Their  study  found that a 
10-percentage  point  increase in  the replacement rate  was associated  with  about 
a one week  increase  in the average length  of  unemployment  spells.  The 
etimates  in  Solon  (1985) imply between  a  half a week  and a full week  increase 
in  mean durations  from a 10-percentage  point  increase  in  the replacement  rate. 22 
examination  seems warranted.  The sources of variation  in benefit  levels in 
the 12 state CWBH  data  are norilinearities in  the benefit  schedules 
(especially  different minima  and  5axima  across  states)  legislative  changes 
during  the sample  period, and the erosion of real  benefit  levels  due to 
inflation between  legislative  changes.  Differences  in  the average benefit 
generosity across  states  is absorbed  by  the state fixed effects  in the 
specifications,  and  pre-Ul  weekly  earnings are included as an  explanatory 
variable. 
Within  a given  state  at a  point  in  time, the benefIt level  is  usually a 
simple nonlinear  function  of previous earnings.  T'nus,  it has beer, argued, 
most  notably  in  Welch (1977), that  effects of the benefit  level  on 
unemployment  cannot  be separated  from  the effects of  previous  earnings.  hile 
I believe  it is  extreme to apply  this criticism  to the data  set used  here,  as 
a check on these estimates  I plan  to  examine unemployment  spells in the 
months  around  changes in State UI laws. 23 
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Table I 
Descriptive  Statisticsa 
.  Variable  .  .  Minimum  . 
Maximum  Mean  Standard 
.  deviation 
Age  170000  80.0000  36.4193  12.0659 
Number of dependents  0.0000  6.0000  1.4288  14518 
lMarried,  spouse  present  0.0000  1.0000  0.6972  0.4595 
IWhite  0.0000  1.0000  0.8000  0.4000 
Years of schooling 
UI benefitb 
0.0000 
14.9100 
17.0000 
160.0000 
11.6113 
104.2192 
2.5457 
27.9338 
Pre-IJI  income  after taxesb  18.3300  443.4800  169,4875  66,5421 
UI replacement  rate  0.1930  0.9852  0.6600  0.1562 
Initial length  of benefitsc  8.0000  55.0000  34.2618  8.7977 
State unemployment rate  4.7000  14.8100  8.6991  2.0812 
Weeks benefits received  1.0000  39.0000  13.0487  10.3528 
aN_3365 
b3enefits and income  are in 1977 dollars. 
Clnitial length  of benefits is the number of weeks of benefits an 
individual  is entitled to when his spell  begins. 27 
Table 2 
Failures, Censorings,  and the Kaplan-Heier 
Eipirical Hazarda 
Week  Risk  Set  Failures  Censorings  Hazard Standard 
t  R(t)  D(t)  C(t)  H(t)  error 
1  3365  277  0  08232  .0047 
2  3062  203  26  .06630  0045 
3  2832  159  27  .05614  .0043 
4  2657  161  16  .06059  .0046 
5  2458  123  38  .05004  .0044 
6  2271  112  64  .04932  .0045 
7  2112  88  47  .04167  .0043 
8  1984  82  40  .04133  .0045 
9  1850  86  52  .04649  .0049 
10  1722  63  42  .03659  .0045 
11  1621  68  38  .04195  .0050 
12  1520  91  33  .05987  .0061 
13  1402  71  27  .05064  .0059 
14  1300  58  31  .04462  .0057 
15  1210  55  32  .04545  .0060 
16  1134  46  21  .04056  .0059 
17  1077  60  11  .05571  .0070 
18  999  58  18  .05806  .0074 
19  936  44  5  .04701  .0069 
20  880  41  12  .04659  .0071 
21  829  49  10  .05911  .0082 
22  773  45  7  .05821  .0084 
23  721  44  7  .06103  .0089 
24  662  34  15  .05136  .0086 
25  610  48  18  .07869  .0109 
26  430  45  132  .10465  .0148 
27  378  26  7  .06878  .0130 
28  317  30  35  .09464  .0164 
29  279  21  8  .07527  .0158 
30  245  13  13  .05306  .0143 
31  226  9  6  .03982  .0130 
32  212  17  5  08019  .0187 
33  190  5  5  .02632  .0116 
34  178  8  7  .04494  .0155 
35  165  13  5  .07879  .0210 
36  121  12  31  .09917  .0272 
37  105  6  4  .05714  .0227 
38  1  9  8  .09890  .0313 
a2380 failures were observed,  and 985 censorings. 
201 of  the censorings  occurred at  exhaustion  of benefits. 28 
Table 3 
Frequency Table for Initial and M  xiuii Length of Benefits 
Number of weeks  Initial  lengtha  Maximum lengthb 
1  0  0 
2  0  0 
3  0  0 
4  0  0 
5  0  0 
6  0  0 
7  0  0 
8  1  1 
9  0  0 
10  0  0 
11  0  0 
12  0  0 
13  0  0 
14  3  3 
15  2  2 
16  6  3 
17  9  9 
19  6  5 
20  24  19 
21  27  17 
22  21  17 
23  28  21 
24  42  29 
25  27  18 
26  988  645 
27  10  8 
28  208  154 
29  8  5 
30  115  44 
31  3  6 
32  42  46 
33  17  18 
34  9  5 
35  15  20 
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Table  3--Continued 
Number of weeks  Initial lengtha  Maximum  lengthb 
36  230  258 
37  2  1 
38  49  36 
39  890  919 
40  145  138 
41  2  1 
42  12  3 
43  4  7 
44  22  7 
45  3  1 
46  4  6 
47  3  9 
48  3  15 
49  122  222 
50  53  :  67 
51  0  0 
52  3  94 
53  124  296 
54  0.  0 
55  76  186 
alnitial  length  is the number  of weeks of benefits  an 
individual  is entitled  to when his  spell begins. 
bMaximium  length  is the maximum  number of weeks  a person 
becomes  entitled to in the course of his spell.  Maximum  length 
exceeds initial length  whenever  benefits  are extended. 30 
Table 4 
Tine  Until Benefits Lapse Epirica1  Hazarda 
Weeks  .  Standard 
Risk set  Failures  Censorings  Hazard 
left  error 
1  303  50  1  .165017  .0213 
2  336  24  3  .071429  .0140 
3  390  38  1  .097436  .0150 
4  430  30  2  .069767  .0123 
5  466  31  1  .066524  .0115 
6  505  25  1  .049505  .0097 
7  543  28  1  .051565  .0095 
8  578  28  0  .048443  .0089 
9  617  28  5  .045381  .0084 
10  673  38  3  .056464  .0089 
11  755  52  5  .068876  .0092 
12  825  44  5  .053333  .0078 
13  909  54  16  .059406  .0078 
14  1011  59  5  .058358  .0074 
15  1084  49  6  .045203  .0063 
16  1132  40  6  .035336  .0055 
17  1217  63  7  .051767  .0064 
18  1300  59  3  .045385  .0058 
19  1367  68  8  .049744  .0059 
20  1435  72  7  .050174  .0058 
21  1696  69  6  .046123  .0054 
22  1577  91  9  .057705  .0059 
23  1654  82  14  .049577  .0053 
24  1774  121  15  .068207  .0060 
25  1954  138  13  .070624  .0058 
26  1030  52  22  .050485  .0068 
27  1101  66  24  .059946  .0072 
28  956  48  27  .050209  .0071 
29  1036  42  21  .040541  .0061 
30  986  50  27  .050710  .0070 
31  1040  55  22  .052885  .0069 
32  1071  67  14  .062558  .0074 
33  1124  58  21  .051601  .0066 
34  1210  74  20  .061157  .0069 
35  1281  66  19  .051522  .0062 
36  1110  71  6  .063964  .0073 
37  1193  78  23  .065381  .0072 
38  1231  85  21  .069050  .0072 
39  370  15  19  .040541  .0103 
40  253  11  19  .043478  .0128 
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Table  4--Continued 
Weeks 
left 
.  Risk set  .  Failures  . 
Censorings  Hazard 
Standard 
error 
41  268  11  14  .041045  .0121 
42  265  9  25  .033962  .0111 
43  303  18  20 
•  .059406  .0136 
44  300  12  26  .040000  .0113 
45  312  13  24  .041667  .0113 
46  325  9  23  .027692  .0091 
47  355  21  30  .059155  .0125 
48  375  20  25  .053333  .0116 
49  275  15  23  .054545  .0137 
50  239  9  13  .037657  .0123 
51  228  11  12  .048246  .0142 
52  202  8  11  .039604  .0137 
53  78  2  8  .025641  .0179 
54  76  3  0  .039474  .0223 
aThis empirical hazard  differs  from the Kaplan-Meier 
hazard  with the time axis reversed  for two reasons.  First, 
people  begin  with  different  lengths  of benefits.  Second, 
the time until benefits  lapse does not always decrease by 
one each  week,  since the length  of benefits  often  changes. 
Thus,  the accounting  identity  given in footnote  8 will not 
hold and  a person  may appear  more than  once  in the ri•sk set 
for  a given week. 32 
Table 5 
Hazard Model  Estimatesa 
Specification  Variable 
(2) 
Number of dependents  -.0418 
(0.0169) 
-.0422 
(0.0171) 
-.0416 
(0.0168) 
-.0386  -0386 
(0.0239)  (0.0242) 
lmarried,  spouse  present  .1302 
(0.0508) 
.1221 
(0.0515) 
.1315 
(0.0507) 
.1006  .1001 
(0.0722)  (0.0730) 
lwhite  .2097 
(0.0572) 
.2230 
(0,0579) 
.2171 
(0.0568) 
.2337  .2364 
(0.0834)  (0.084],) 
Years of schooling  -.0276 
(0.0083) 
-.0275 
(0.0084) 
-.0272 
(0.0083) 
-.0177  -.0176 
(0.0123)  (0.0124) 
Log UI benefit level  -.8782 
(0.1091) 
-.8157 
(0.1096) 
-.8478 
(0.1088) 
-.8685  -.8757 
(0.2042)  (0.2065) 
Log pre-iJI after tax wage  .5630 
(0.0855) 
.5651 
(0.0860) 
.5530 
(0.0848) 
.7289  .7411 
(0.1415)  (0.1433) 
Age 17-24  .2596 
(0.0855) 
.2613 
(0.0865) 
.2636 
(0.0855) 
.2664  .2670 
(0.1242)  (0.1256) 
Age 25-34  .1545 
(0.0750) 
.1542 
(0.0759) 
.1529 
(0.0749) 
.1080  .1068 
(0.1066)  (0.1078) 
Age 35-44  .1642 
(0.0776) 
.1594 
(0.0787) 
.1621 
(0.0774) 
.1466  .1492 
(0.1110)  (0.1122) 
Age 45-54  .0473 
(0.0828) 
.0417 
(0.0837) 
.0460 
(0.0827) 
.0234  .0239 
(0.1156)  (0.1169) 
State  unemployment  rate 
Exhaustion  spline:b 
UI 1 
- .0237 
(0.0133) 
.6772 
(0.2470) 
.0019 
(0.0126) 
.6473 
(0.1996) 
- .0234 
(0.0134) 
.5977 
(0.2479) 
.0967  .0993 
(0.0216)  (0,0218) 
.7379  .6670 
(0.2499)  (0.2513) 
UI 2-5  .  .1288 
(0.0612) 
.1468 
(0.0519) 
.1665 
(0.0618) 
.1448  .1847 
(0.0625)  (0.0634) 33 
Table 5--Continued 
Variable 
Specification 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
UI 6-10  .0054 
(0.0317) 
.0183 
(0.0280) 
.0012 
(0.0317) 
.0054 
(0.0334) 
.0052 
(0.0336) 
UI 11-25  - .0052 
(0.0068) 
.0074 
(0.0063) 
- .0067 
(0.0068) 
- .0093 
(0.0078) 
- .0102 
(0,0078) 
UI 26-40  - .0018 
(0.0064) 
.0016 
(0.0063) 
- .0008 
(0.0064) 
- .0001 
(0.0074) 
.0015 
(0.0075) 
UI 41-54  .0211 
(0.0133) 
.0264 
(0.0133) 
.0209 
(0.0134) 
.029-1 
(0.0152) 
.0289 
(0.0152) 
Benefits previously 
expected to lapseC  . 
1.4643 
(0.1876) 
1.6280 
(0.2006) 
State fixed effects  no  no  no  yes  yes 
Nonparametric  baseline  yesd  no  yese  yes  yes 
Heterogeneity  variance  g  g  g  .7560 
(0.1943) 
.7901 
(0.1953) 
Sample size  3365  3365  3365  3365  3365 
Log-likelihood  value  -9038.07  -9085.06  -9015.68  -8927.80  890l.94 
aStandard  errors  are shown in parentheses. 
bThe exhaustion  spline  variables  are defined in the text. 
C1f earlier in the spell  benefits  were expected  to lapse  in the 
current  week, the variable equals  1; otherwise  it equals  0. 
dBaseline  hazard  parameters  are reported  in Table 7. 
eBaseline  hazard  parameters  are reported  in Table 8, 
Baseline  hazard  parameters  are reported  in Table 9. 
gme unconstrained  estimate  of the variance is zero. 34 
Table 6 
Additional Hazard Xodel Esti1atesa 
Specification  Variable 
(6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Number of dependents  .0291  - .0286  - .0213  - .0263 
(0.0172)  (0.0171)  (0.0286)  (0.0235) 
lmarried, spouse present  .0914 
(0.0510) 
.0972 
(0.0507) 
.1139 
(0.0861) 
.0956 
(0.0699) 
1whjte  .1605 
(0.0581) 
.1597 
(0,0578) 
.1339 
(0.1080) 
.1768 
(0.0801) 
Years of schooling  .0118 
(0.0085) 
- .0124 
(0.0085) 
- .0085 
(0,0150) 
- .0107 
(0,0129) 
Log UI benefit level  - .6021 
(0.1390) 
- .5993 
(0,1386) 
- .5326 
(0.2420) 
- .5683 
(0.1868) 
Log Pre-Ul after tax wage  .5112 
(0,0938) 
.4926 
(0.0943) 
.5327 
(0.1643) 
• 
.2975 
(0.1391) 
Age 17-24  .2291 
(0.0863) 
.2355 
(0.0859) 
.3116 
(0.1541) 
.0350 
(0.1172) 
Age 25-34  .1072 
(0.0758) 
.1110 
(0.0754) 
.1725 
(0.1331) 
- .0411 
(0.1031) 
Age 35-44  .1001 
(0.0789) 
.1070 
(0.0787) 
.0180 
(0.1367) 
.0505 
(0.1049) 
Age 45-54  .0314 
(0.0836) 
.0323 
(0.0832) 
.0354 
(0.1447) 
- .0674 
(0.1152) 
State unemployment rate  .0794 
(0.0153) 
.0588 
(0.0166) 
.0389 
(0.0263) 
.3104 
(0.0363) 
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Table 6--Continued 
Specification 
Variable 
(6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Exhaustion spline:b 
UI  1  .6430  .5772  .8942  .4978 
(0.2002)  (0.2490)  (0.4627)  (0.3182) 
UI 2-5  .1610  .1669  .1538  .0595 
(0.0521)  (0.0621)  (0.1271)  (0.0746) 
UI 6-10  .0183  .0051  .0124  -  .0369 
(0.0281)  (0.0320)  (0.0629)  (0.0404) 
UI 11-25  .0045  - .0052  .0031  -  .0682 
(0.0064)  (0.0070)  (0.0120)  (0.0101) 
UI 26-40  .0105  .0063  - .0089  - .0525 
(0.0065)  (0.0068)  (0.0099)  (0.0112) 
UI 41-54  .0253  .0213  .0267  d 
(0.0136)  (0.0138)  (0.0164) 
Benefits previously  1.7707  1.5391  1.2403  d 
expected to lapseC  (0.1558)  (0.1881)  (0.2902) 
State fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Nonparametric baseline  no  yes  yes  yes 
Heterogeneity variance  e  .1829  e 
(0.1936) 
Sample size  3365  3365  1844  1521 
Log-likelihood value  -8935.95  -890679  -3994.54  -4729.65 
aStandard errors are shown in parentheses. 
bThe exhaustion spline variables are defined in the text. 
C1f earlier in the  spell benefits were expected to lapse in the 
current week,  this variable equals 1; otherwise it equals 0, 
dmere is insufficient variation in the sample to estimate this 
coefficient. 
eThe unconstrained estimate of the variance is zero. 36 
Table 7 
Baseline Hazard  Parameters frog Specification (1) 
Standard  Week  Hazard 
error 
Nonlinear 95% 
confidence intevla 
1  0.08248  0.00507  (  0.07311  ,  0.09304 
2  0.06642  0.00474  (  0.05775  0.07640 
3  0.05628  0,00458  (  0.04798  ,  0.06601 
4  0.06115  0.00495  (  0.05218  0.07166 
5  0.05046  0.00467  (  0.04209  0.06048 
6  0.04987  0.00485  (  0.04122  0.06034 
7  0.04206  0.00459  (  0.03396  0.05209 
8  0.04184  0.00479  (  0.03344  0.05236 
9  0.04730  0.00532  (  0.03795  0.05896 
10  0.03717  0.00488  (  0.02874  0.04809 
11  0.04279  0,00546  (  003332  0.05496 
12  0.06187  0.00700  (  0.04956  0.07722 
13  0.05214  0.00663  (  0.04064  0.06689 
14  0.04592  0.00642  ( 0.03491  0.06039 
15  0.04694  0.00680  ( 0.03534  ,  0.06236 
16  0.04168  0.00658  (  0.03058  0.05681 
17  0.05753  0.00813  (  0.04361  0.07589 
18  0.06018  0.00870  (  0.04533  0.07991 
19  0.04814  0.00795  (  0.03482  0.06655 
20  0.04762  0.00824  (  0.03393  0.06684 
21  0.05959  0.00964  (  0.04340  0.08181 
22  0.05699  0.00936  (  0.04130  ,  0.07863 
23  0.05713  0.00991  (  0.04067  0.08027 
24  0.04624  0.00905  (  0.03151  0.06785 ) 
25  0.05513  0.01081  C  0.03755  0.08096 
26  0.11264  0.01886  (  0.08113  0.15638 
27  0.06533  0.01446  (  0.04233  0.10082 
28  0.10545  0.02129  (  0.07099  0.15664 
29  0.08165  0.01926  (  0.05143  ,  0.12964 
30  0.05887  0.01701  (  0.03341  ,  0.10373 
31  0.04216  0.01472  (  0.02126  0.08359 
32  0.08581  0.02276  (  0.05103  0.14432 
33  0.02686  0.01249  (  0.01080  0.06683 
34  0.04289  0.01584  (  0.02079  0.08845 
35  0.05881  0.01766  (  0.03265  0.10594 
36  0.09162  0.02890  (  0.04937  0.17001 
37  0.04583  0.02019  (  0.01932  0.10869 
38  0.04989  0.01859  (  0.02404  0.10355 
aThe confidence intervals are calculated using a 
suggestion in Kalblfleisch and Prentice (1980).  The 
hazard estimates and the  standard errors are trans- 
formed to insure that the confidence intervals lie 
between 0 and 1.  The normal approximatton used to 
calculate confidence intervals is more reasonable 
for the transformed hazard, especially for values of 
the hazard close to 0 or 1. 37 
Table 8 
Baseline Hazard Parameters fro. Specification (3) 
aThe confidence intervals are calculated using  a 
suggestion  in Kalblfleisch and Prentice (1980).  The 
hazard estimates and the standard errors are trans- 
formed to insure that the confidence intervals lie 
between 0 and 1.  The normal approximation used to 
calculate confidence intervals is more reasonable 
for the transformed  hazard, especially for values of 
the hazard close to 0 or 1. 
Week 
Nonlinear 95% 
confidence intervala 
Hazard 
Standard 
error 
1  0,08259  0.00508  C  0.07321  •  0.09317 ) 
2  0.06653  0.00475  (  0.05784  ,  0.07652 
3  0.05638  0.00459  ( 0.04807  •  0.06613 
4  0.06128  0.00496  (  0.05229  •  0.07181 
5  0.05057  0.00468  ( 0.04219  ,  0.06062 
6  0.04999  0.00486  ( 0.04132  •  0.06048 
7  0.04217  0.00460  ( 0.03404  ,  0.05222 
8  0.04196  0.00480  (  0.03353  ,  0.05251  ) 
9  0.04743  0.00533  (  0.03805  ,  0.05913  ) 
10  0.03729  0.00490  (  0.02882  ,  0.04824 
11  0.04294  0.00548  (  0.03344 
•  0.05514 
12  0.06208  0.00702  (  0.04974  ,  0.07749 
13  0.05233  0.00665  (  0.04079  ,  0.06713  ) 
14  0.04612  0.00645  (  0.03507  ,  0.06066  ) 
15  0.04717  0.00683  (  0.03551  ,  0.06266 
16  0.04176  0.00661  (  0.03063  ,  0,05695 
17  0.05794  0.00819  (  0.04391  ,  0.07644 
18  0.06070  0.00878  (  0.04571  ,  0.08060 
19  0.04831  0.00799  (  0.03494  •  0.06679  ) 
20  0.04783  0.00827  (  0.03408  ,  0.06714 
21  0.05953  0.00963  (  0.04335  •  0.08174 
22  0.05612  0.00924  (  0.04063  ,  0.07750 
23  0.05551  0.00967  (  0.03945  •  0.07810 
24  0.04423  0.00870  (  0.03008  ,  0.06503  ) 
25  0.05368  0.01062  (  0.03642  •  0.07911 
26  0.06529  0.01271  (  0.04459  0.09562 
27  0.06467  0.01444  (  0.04175  ,  0.10019 
28  0.09327  0.01984  (  0.06147  •  0.14152 
29  0.08227  0.01941  (  0.05180  ,  0.13064 ) 
30  0.04872  0.01393  (  0.02782  ,  0.08532  ) 
31  0.04253  0.01487  C  0.02144  0.08439 
32  0.08080  0.02148  (  0.04799 
•  0.13604 
33  0.02643  0.01229  (  0.01062  ,  0.06574 
34  0.04132  0.01546  (  0.01984  ,  0.08604 
35  0.05722  0.01720  (  0.03115  •  0.10312 
36  0.05472  0.01694  (  0.02982  ,  0.10040 
37  0.04225  0.01867  (  0.01777  ,  0.10046 
38  0.04538  0.01739  C  0.02142  •  0.09616  ) 38 
Table 9 
Baseline Hazard Paraieters  frog Specification (5) 
Standard  Nonlinear 95%  Week  Hazard  a  error  confidence interval 
1  0.07678  0.00506  ( 0.06747  •  0.08737 
2  0.06733  0.00510  ( 0.05804  0.07811 
3  006086  0.00547  ( 0.05104  •  0.07257 
4  0.07039  0.00675  ( 0.05833  0.08493 
5  0.06174  0.00699  ( 0.04945  0.07708 
6  0.06484  0.00811  ( 0.05075  0.08285 
7  0.05756  0.00800  (  0.04384  ,  0.07558 
8  0.05972  0.00888  (  0.04462  0.07992 
9  0.07002  0.01055  (  0.05212  0.09408 
10  0.05676  0.00976  (  0.04052  0.07950 
11  0.06740  0.01182  (  0.04780  0.09504 
12  0.10158  0.01764  (  0.07227  0.14278 
13  0.08977  0.01720  (  0.06166  0.13068 
14  0.08221  0.01673  (  0.05517  0.12250 
15  008728  0.01902  (  0.05695  0.13377 
16  0.07952  0.01821  (  0.05077  0.12456 
17  0.11423  0.02604  (  0.07307  0.17858 
18  0.12548  0.03013  (  0.07838  0.20088 
19  0.10432  0.02734  (  0.06242  •  0.17436 
20  0.10653  0.02949  (  0.06192  ,  0.18329 
21  0.13753  0.03766  (  0.08042  0.23522 
22  0.13529  0.03839  ( 0.07758  0.23593 
23  0.13898  0.04144  (  0.07747  0.24932 
24  0.11567  0.03674  ( 0.06206  0.21557 
25  0.14613  0.04820  ( 0.07656 
,  0.27892 
26  0.18764  0.06260  (  0.09757  ,  0.36084 
27  0.19283  0.06945  ( 0.09519  0.39063 
28  0.28961  0.10902  ( 0.13848  •  0.60566 
29  0.28126  0.11213  (  0.12876  0.61441 
30  0.17664  0.07732  (  0.07490  0.41657 
31  0.15690  0.07764  (  0.05949  0.41382 
32  0.31372  0.13892  (  0.13171  0.74726 
33  0.10833  0.06347  (  003436 
,  0.34156 
34  0.16971  0.09050  (  0.05968  0.48263 
35  0.24550  0.11848  (  0.09533  0.63220 
36  0.24293  0.12045  (  0.09193  0.64198 
37  0.18918  0.11646  (  0.05661  0.63224 
38  0.20221  0.11487  (  0.06641  0.61571 
aThe confidence intervals are calculated using a 
suggestion in Kalblfleisch and Prentice (1980)  .  The 
hazard  estimates  and  the  standard  errors  are  trans- 
formed  to  insure  that  the confidence intervals lie 
between 0  and 1.  The  norna1 approximation  used to 
calculate confidence intervals is more reasonable 
for the  transformed  hazard,  especially for values of 
the hazard close to 0 or 1. Figure  1 
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